Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is A = 0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We should therefore reconsider the assumptions that led to this conclusion: for instance, the measure of accuracy. 
the various magnitudes in which you are interested. It is plausible that the undesirability of errors might rise more than linearly with the size of the errors. Thus you might wish to measure accuracy by considering, say, the squared error of the inductive method in various estimating tasks.
But you cannot just pick the most accurate method-not unless you already know the actual values of the magnitudes you wish to estimate, in which case you do not need to estimate them. The best you can do is pick the inductive method with the highest estimated accuracy, just as you might bet on the horse with the highest estimated speed.
The trouble is that you need an inductive method to estimate anything, even to estimate the accuracy of various inductive methods. And your selection of a method with the highest estimated accuracy will come out differently depending on which method you use to make the estimate. It is as if Consumer Reports, Consumer Bulletin, etc., each published rankings of the consumers' magazines, as they do of other products. You would have to know which one to read in order to find out which one to read.
Let us say that an inductive method C recommends an inductive method C' if the C-mean estimate of the accuracy of C' is not exceeded by the C-mean estimate of the accuracy of any rival method. An inductive method might or might not recommend itself. If it does, let us call it immodest. When asked which method has the best estimated accuracy, the immodest method answers: "I have. " We may restate these definitions more precisely, making explicit reference to the class of competing inductive methods, to the way in which accuracy is measured, and to the total evidence available for use in estimating accuracies of methods. Oh, yes indeed, you may be sure that my crystal gazing yields reliable answers to all your questions. I know that it does, for I conducted an empirical inquiry into the matter; seeking an answer to the question whether my crystal gazing is a reliable way of answering questions, I looked into my crystal ball, and the answer that I saw there was "Yes." But reverse the question: would non-immodesty give you any good reason not to trust an inductive method? Indeed it would. Suppose you did trust some nonimmodest method. By definition, it estimates some competing method to be more accurate than itself. So if you really did trust your original method, you should take its advice and transfer your trust to one of the competing methods it recommends. It is as if Consumer Bulletin were to advise you that Consumer Reports was a best buy whereas Consumer Bulletin itself was not acceptable; you could not possibly trust Consumer Bulletin completely thereafter.
The answer to our first question, whether immodesty is a good reason to trust an inductive method, ought to be: it depends on the competition. Any immodest method deserves your trust more than any non-immodest method, but the immodest methods must compete among themselves on other grounds. Immodesty is a necessary but not sufficient condition of adequacy for inductive methods.
The requirement of immodesty will not help you much in choosing an inductive method unless few of the otherwise adequate methods are immodest. We might expect all methods to be immodest; in that case, it will get you nowhere to require immodesty as a condition of adequacy. How many methods are immodest?
We cannot answer this question yet; we must first specify the class M of methods you wish to choose from, the accuracy-measure A you have adopted, and your total available evidence e.
Assume (1)
The approximation consists in taking estimated relative frequencies in the rest of the universe excluding the t things described byj, rather than estimated relative frequencies in the entire universe; thus it is a good approximation when t is sufficiently small compared to N. Carnap Suppose finally that as you set out to pick an inductive method your total available evidence e is a complete description of a certain sample containing s things such that, for each kind i, si things in the sample belong to kind i.
Having specified the class of inductive methods you wish to choose from, the accuracy-measure you wish to maximize, and the total evidence at your disposal, we are ready to reconsider the question: how many methods are immodest? The answer is: exactly one.
To show this, we begin by noting that CA recommends CA' on the evidence e if and only if A' is chosen to maximize the CA-mean estimate of At(CA'). Since At(CA,) is linear with 2i ri -we thus denote the magnitude whose value at any possible world w is >ji ri(w)2 -we find that the CA-mean estimate on e of At(CA,) is given by (2). Setting the derivative of (2) with respect to A' equal to 0 and solving, we obtain (3). We can easily verify that (3) gives a maximum value of (2).
(3)
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Observe that the parameter t has now vanished. That is why we were free to choose t arbitrarily. Equation (3) gives a necessary and sufficient condition for CA to recommend CAT under any one of the accuracy-measures At.
Next, let h range over all possible statistical distributions: that is, propositions giving the relative frequencies in the universe of each of the k kinds. Since the statistical distributions are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions, and since every statistical distribution h implies that each r, has a definite value rih, we can easily obtain (4). Next, let d be the proposition that a certain two things-an arbitrarily chosen two not in the sample described by e-both belong to the same kind. This proposition is of no relevance to our topic in itself; but it happens that by considering it we can obtain some useful equations. Since the statistical distributions are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, we obtain (7). 
Given the system of equations (3)-(9), it is now merely a matter of laborious algebra to solve for A' in terms of N, s, and A.
The plan is as follows. First substitute the right hand side of (8) for the left hand side of (7) and the right hand side of (9) for the right hand side of (7). After simplifying the resulting equation with the aid of (4), (5), and (6), it becomes possible to solve for E&,(j rf I e) in terms of N, s, A, and k. Substituting this solution into (3) and simplifying further, we eventually obtain (10) as a necessary and sufficient condition for CA to recommend CA'. What can we do about this conclusion? We might accept it; but it amounts to a severe inductive scepticism. Ordinary scepticism is content to claim that there is no good reason to adopt any particular inductive method, but this scepticism is worse: it claims that there are good reasons not to adopt any given inductive method. So much the worse for any philosophical argument that leads to such a conclusion! It will not help to use an exact expression for mean square error in place of the approximation (1). I used that approximation for simplicity and to stay close to [2] . But an exact expression is known (R. Carnap, personal communication); and when that is used in place of (1) in defining accuracy, it turns out to lead to the same unwelcome conclusion: C0 is uniquely immodest on evidence consisting of an empty or uniform sample.
We can hardly overcome our objections to choosing C0. If trusting C0 in the cases I described would not be a clear case of inductive unreason, what would be?
I do not think we should escape by rejecting immodesty as a condition of adequacy. Consider what that would mean. If you wish to maximize accuracy in choosing a method, and you have knowingly given your trust to any but an immodest method, how can you justify staying with the method you have chosen? If you really trust your method, and you really want to maximize accuracy, you should take your method's advice and maximize accuracy by switching to some other method that your original method recommends. If that method also is not immodest, and you trust it, and you still want to maximize accuracy, you should switch again; and so on, unless you happen to hit upon an immodest method. Immodesty is a condition of adequacy because it is a necessary condition for stable trust.
We might escape by looking beyond the A-methods, hoping that in some larger class of inductive methods we will always find an immodest method better than C0. Carnap gives conditions of adequacy that rule out all but the A-methods; but, as he recognizes, some of these conditions are onlyprimafacie plausible. Moreover, there are certain well-known objections to the A-methods, independently of the problem of the unique immodesty of C0.
Alternatively, we might escape by rejecting Carnap's mean square error accuracymeasures; I prefer this way out. The reasons for demanding immodesty under whatever accuracy-measure you want to maximize seem to me strong, but it is not at all obvious that you should want to maximize accuracy as measured by mean square error of estimates of relative frequencies of kinds. These measures are suggested by well-established practices in statistics, for instance least-squares curve-fitting. We have studied them because Carnap used them in [2] , but Carnap did not argue for them there. If rejecting them is an easy way out of the problem of the unique immodesty of C0, that seems a rather good reason for rejecting them.
One plausible change in the accuracy-measure comes to mind at once. Perhaps in taking the mean square error of estimates of relative frequencies of kinds on the basis of samples of size t, we should take the mean not over all such samples but only over those which include the sample described by our total evidence e. (This would mean choosing t > s.) Why care about error in cases we already know cannot arise? This change might be appropriate on other grounds, but it will not solve our difficulty: C0 is still uniquely immodest when s = 0.
To summarize: I have argued that immodesty-in the class of otherwise adequate methods, under an appropriate accuracy-measure, on the total evidence-is a necessary condition of inductive adequacy. Whether it is a condition that will help much in choosing a method depends on how selective it is. When it is applied to the A-methods, using Carnap's accuracy measures, it is extremely selective. But it is too selective, since sometimes there is no adequate method left. I take this not as an objection to the condition of immodesty, but rather as a reason to expand the class of eligible inductive methods, to find a different accuracy-measure, or both. Having done one or both, we will face a new version of the question: how many, and which, inductive methods are immodest?
